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PROSPECTS FOR KOREAN SECURITY*

Richard L. Sneider

Background Paper

Background Paper for the Security Conference on Asia and the Pacific (SeCAP) Workshop on "Challenges to Security in East Asia," to be held January 8-10, 1982 in Palm Springs, California

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Chapter 6 PROSPECTS FOR KOREAN SECURITY

Richard L. Sneider¹

The border between South and North Korea is one of the most dangerous in the world, with a high potential for all-out conflict and the ever-present danger of military incidents. Conflict could arise in the form of a calculated attack across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) dividing the South and North or from a miscalculation in escalatory responses to incidents along the DMZ or in the coastal waters around Korea, particularly near the small islands held by the South adjacent to the north-west coast of North Korea and within North Korean territorial waters. The greatest risk derives from possible North Korean miscalculation regarding the political stability and the depth of political dissent in the South, or from a perception that the United States, weary of involvement in Asian wars, would not intervene to fulfill its commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Since the Korean Armistice Agreement came into effect in 1953, the danger of renewed hostilities has been a dominant factor in the policies of both Korean states as well as in the policies of the outside powers toward the Peninsula. The frequency of military incidents along the DMZ has been very high, although it has declined notably in recent years. The last major incident occurred in August 1976, when the North Koreans killed two Americans who had attempted to cut down a tree within the American Sector of the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom. The dangers of conflict have increased with the growing militarization of the DMZ, more frequent patrols within it, the strengthening of the military capabilities of both sides, the offensive deployment of more and more North Korean forces in areas adjacent to the DMZ, and the avowed objective of the North to achieve unification on its own terms. The shaky peace that has been maintained for more than twenty-five years testifies not only to the restraint exercised by the United Nations (U.N.) and South Korean forces in response to repeated provocations, but also to the balance of forces on the Peninsula, the stake of the four major outside powers—the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (PRC)—in preventing renewed hostilities in Korea, and the incalculable costs of another Korean War.

This paper examines the principal factors that have provided security for the ROK and have deterred a renewal of hostilities. It first examines the principal elements in the deterrence equation—the North-South military balance, the U.S. presence and commitment, the role of Japan, the influence of the PRC and the USSR, the role of the U.N. peace-keeping machinery, and the interrelationship of these elements. It then considers the prospects for security in the 1980s. It finally examines the prospects for negotiating a reduction of tensions in Korea, taking into

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account the factors underlying past failures, the peace-keeping potential of different negotiating scenarios, and incentives for agreements.

The analysis assumes that the four major powers will continue to view Korea as an area of significant national interest. It is also assumed that no fundamental changes will take place in the international environment and power relationships in the foreseeable future; that is, a "straight-line," no-disaster context is assumed. Clearly, such basic changes in the international environment as a Sino-Soviet war (or rapprochement), the remilitarization of Japan, heightened U.S.-Soviet tensions, or a return to U.S. neo-isolationist policies would have a major impact on Korea and would necessitate a full reevaluation of current and prospective security arrangements.

THE STAKE OF THE OUTSIDE POWERS IN KOREA

Korea historically has been a country of strategic importance to its neighboring states. Throughout the centuries, Japan and China have vied for influence and control over the Peninsula, which has served as the land bridge between them. Korea's strategic importance has greatly increased in this century, particularly as a result of the Soviet Union's growing role in Asia. The interests of the various key players in Korea are summarized below.

The Communist Powers

Both the Soviet Union and the PRC would consider control over the northern portion of Korea by a unified, non-communist Korea allied to the West to be inimical to their interests. Their concern over such a development was amply demonstrated by Chinese intervention in the Korean War in 1950, and there have been no subsequent indications that this concern has decreased. The economic and military strength and the future capabilities of South Korea have undoubtedly enhanced their uneasiness. Both the Soviet Union and the PRC avow a preference for a unified Korea, although each would be threatened by a Korea unified under a communist regime allied to the other.

The Soviets and the PRC would both consider any effort to unify Korea, particularly by military force, as highly risky, for a number of reasons. First, any conflict in Korea would carry the implicit risk of a broader confrontation involving the great powers. Second, the anticipated Japanese reaction is of great concern, particularly to the PRC, since a major rearmament effort would probably result. Third, both of the communist powers would prefer to avoid hostilities in the region, since the United States would be likely to intervene or, at a minimum, would find such action unacceptable in terms of its global interests. Neither country is willing to risk its relationship to the United States for the sake of a unified Korea at the present time. Fourth, both powers would almost certainly be concerned about the potential for independent action which a unified, highly nationalistic (non-communist or communist) Korean regime might exert in the region.

Sino-Soviet interests are not, however, wholly parallel. The Soviets would be concerned that a unified Korea might tip the Sino-Soviet balance toward the Chinese, given the North's bias toward China. On the other hand, Moscow may, in the longer term, be tempted to support an effort at unification, assuming that the North

could only win with Soviet support and the USSR could then exercise the predominant influence over a unified communist Korea. Moscow would also have to assume that the United States would avoid involvement. A unified communist Korea could tip the balance against Japanese influence in Asia, although the trend toward a U.S.-Japan-PRC entente in Asia might be strengthened, unless Japanese confidence in the United States had been totally compromised by America's failure to defend South Korea.

Given the PRC's plans for modernization, it is unlikely that Beijing (Peking) would be similarly tempted to support a reunification effort through military action because of its likely impact on regional security and thus China's own defense requirements.

Japan

While Japan historically has sought control over Korea, its objective today is to keep the Peninsula neutralized as a direct threat to Japanese security. Tokyo's minimum objective is to maintain a state of peace in Korea, given the risks of renewed hostilities and Japan's probable indirect involvement in them. Second, Japan seeks to prevent communist control over a unified Korea, which would represent a major threat to its own security and economic interests. A communist Korea would likely have far greater military forces than Japan now has and would force a reassessment of Japan's military posture as well as raise internal security problems with its Korean minority. Moreover, a communist victory in Korea would cast grave doubts upon the credibility of the U.S. security commitment to Japan, likewise forcing a reassessment of its military posture and increasing the likelihood of a major rearmament effort. Japan would prefer a unified non-communist Korea, but not at the risk of conflict or of arousing Sino-Soviet countermeasures. Japan might even have qualms about a unified Korea with far more powerful military forces than it now possesses.

The United States

America's security interest in Korea is largely derivative, rather than direct. It derives, first, from U.S. postwar involvement with the ROK, including the Korean War, and from the recognition that disengagement from this involvement is apt to be construed in Asia as another major step toward total disengagement from the security affairs of the region. The Asian reaction to the Carter Administration's announcement in early 1977 of its intention to withdraw all U.S. ground forces from Korea demonstrated this point most forcefully. Second, the U.S. commitment to Korea derives from American interest in establishing a more stable, peaceful regime in East Asia and the recognition that communist control over Korea would fundamentally and adversely affect the balance of power in the region and would be destabilizing both in the immediate future and in the long term.

While the United States accepts the reunification of Korea as an ultimate goal, it has no present interest in pressing for a non-communist unified Korea at the cost of hostilities or in a manner that would be construed by the Soviet Union and the PRC as a direct threat to their interests. The American stake in Korea is destined to expand beyond these security interests during the 1980s, when Korea will

emerge as a significant middle-rank power with the largest military force and the second largest economy in non-communist East Asia.

Finally, U.S. interests in Korea are derived from the treaty commitment to preserve the security of Japan. In fact, the security of the ROK and that of Japan are virtually inseparable; indeed, the security interests of the two countries should be viewed from a broader regional Northeast Asian perspective, rather than as separate issues.

Thus, the major outside powers share a common recognition of the importance of the Korean Peninsula to their interests and tacitly support the common, minimum objective of maintaining the status quo and preventing a reoccurrence of hostilities in Korea. Any change in the status quo would be disadvantageous to two of the outside powers (China and the Soviet Union) and would pose unacceptable risks to the other two (the United States and Japan). Any reoccurrence of open hostilities would potentially involve all four powers, particularly if the hostilities appeared to be leading to a significant change in the status quo in Korea and the Asian power balance.

The communist powers, however, as a result of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, have been unwilling to translate this congruence of interest into joint action to reduce tension. The Soviet Union might support reunification of Korea under communist control in the unlikely circumstance that such a policy involved no serious risks or costs to the USSR in terms of either relations with the United States or influence over North Korea. The United States and Japan, conversely, share the goal of a unified non-communist Korea, but they too would support this development only if it could be achieved without risk or other costs.

NORTH-SOUTH OBJECTIVES

To a much greater degree than the outside powers, both South and North Koreans prefer a unified country, for obvious nationalistic reasons. The prospects for unification as a result of a peaceful process of compromise and agreement, however, are apparently nil for the foreseeable future, given the fundamental ideological differences between the two sides, the impossibility of breaching the leadership gap, and the bitter memories of the Korean War, particularly in the South.

Neither North nor South Korea can be expected to give up its hopes for ultimate unification. The operative question is their relative willingness to accept the status quo—the continued division of Korea—for the indefinite future. Related issues concern whether either state is willing to pay the price of attempting to alter the status quo, and whether either is willing to live with the status quo and contribute to its stabilization by reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

At the present time, the ROK is prepared to accept and stabilize the status quo as an interim step toward unification. Military adventures would be extremely costly to the ROK, given its exposed military position. The Seoul industrial complex is only 30 miles from the DMZ, and the North Koreans are so firmly entrenched in their sector of the zone that an attack on the North is well beyond South Korea's military capabilities.

The North, on the other hand, continues to profess ambitions for unification on its own terms and continues to reject any suggestions for developments that would

reinforce the status quo. Its military posture is essentially offensive and expansive. It has built up its mobile armored forces, increased its firepower, and stationed larger forces in hardened positions closer to the DMZ. On the other hand, the North does have inhibitions about renewing aggression, and it seems to have calculated that the costs of an offensive are too great to incur. At the same time, it disdains any serious efforts to stabilize the status quo by reducing tensions on the Peninsula. The North has forcefully rejected a two-Korea approach, denouncing it as a plot of "splitists" and contrasting the very "different" situations of Germany and Korea. The North is the only power actively seeking to revise the status quo.


Under these circumstances, the prospects for Korean security will depend at a minimum on deterring North Korea from reinitiating hostilities on the Peninsula. A risk of hostilities will still prevail, however, and any improvement in Korean security will depend on reducing tensions and stabilizing the division, both of which require a basic change in North Korean policy. In terms of U.S., Japanese, and ROK interests, these optimum goals are desirable, although it must be noted that the ROK might find that reduced tension poses a new set of problems in maintaining the degree of discipline and unity necessary to support a large and continuing defense effort. The Soviet Union and the PRC would probably not be averse, in principle, to a reduction of Korean tensions in the short term, but both are willing to support a policy dictated by North Korea opposing any step that might stabilize the division of Korea. Neither country has been willing to exert pressures to effect a change in the North Korean position. For the present, deterrence of hostilities is the only alternative.

THE DETERRENCE EQUATION

The Major Components

The deterrence equation consists of several major components which are inherently interrelated: (1) the relative strength of the South Korean forces measured against those of the North; (2) the strength of U.S. forces stationed in Korea or available for action there; (3) the supplementary role of Japan; (4) the weight and direction of Soviet and Chinese influence over the North; and (5) the U.N. peace-keeping machinery. Additionally, the anticipated costs of a conflict deter all parties from initiating one. The first two factors, South Korean and U.S. military strengths as well as the role of Japan, are susceptible to direct control by the major powers. The latter two are subject to only a degree of outside influence and are therefore less dependable elements of the deterrence equation. Thus U.S. and ROK decisions concerning force levels must be made without reference to the other powers involved. On the other hand, efforts to increase the deterrent effect of the Sino-Soviet balance or of the U.N. peace-keeping machinery hinge upon a reciprocal action on the part of the communist powers.

The critical question in evaluating deterrence in Korea is, in fact, how large a deterrent force is necessary and how much risk a given level of deterrence incurs. Deterrence does not consist only of the war-fighting capabilities of the U.S. and ROK forces; it also involves the countermeasures being developed in the North (which are not easy to calculate) and, more importantly, the perceptions of the



communist powers, particularly the North, regarding the deterrent forces and their credibility. Deterrence may be achieved at low levels of military strength if the North considers these levels sufficiently strong to make the costs of aggression too great. A crucial component in the North's perception must therefore be the will or intention of the status quo powers to use wheir forces in the case of aggression.

The assessment of intent to use force is particularly relevant to U.S. military capabilities. The North has a distinct advantage in that its major population and industrial centers are located almost 200 miles from the North-South boundary, whereas the Seoul industrial and political center is only 30 miles from the DMZ. The willingness of the United States to commit its forces to compensate for this advantage is a crucial element in the North's assessment of the risks of aggression. Likewise, South Korean concerns about the U.S. will to fight have led some to advocate an independent South Korean retaliatory capacity which would include nuclear weapons.

The North undoubtedly assumes that the ROK will use every capability at its command, but it may assume that those capabilities are limited by internal weaknesses. The North constantly conjures up a vision of broad internal dissent in the South, which could lead to dangerous miscalculation and misadventure. By the same token, the North may recognize the inherent military strength of the United States, but it may assume that U.S. forces will avoid engagement in a conflict situation, or will not be reinforced by American military assets stationed outside Korea, or will find that Japanese support for U.S. military operations in the area is sufficiently circumscribed as to weaken the response to aggression. Thus, any evaluation of deterrence by force must consider not only actual military strength but also the perception of this strength in the minds of the North Koreans whose isolation and ideological bent could lead to gross miscalculation—although it should be noted that that has not been the case since the armistice in 1953.

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The North-South Balance

Military Strength. Modernization of the North Korean forces commenced in the mid-1960s, approximately five years before similar steps were taken in the South. In addition, the resources devoted to the military buildup in the North have been consistently greater than those in the South: 15 to 20 percent of the North's Gross National Product (GNP) has been devoted to direct defense support, compared to 6.5 percent or less in the South.

The North-South military balance in 1977 was as follows:2

Republic of Korea (South Korea)

Population 34,410,000 Military Service: Army and Marines 2½ years Navy and Air Force 3 years Total armed forces: 625,000 Estimated GNP (1974): \$17.5 bn Defense expenditure (1975): 353.1 bn won (\$719 m.) \$1 = 491 won (1975), 397 won (1974)

Army 560,000
23 infantry divisions
2 armored brigades
40 artillery battalions
1 SSM battalion with Honest John
2 SAM bns each with 2 Hawk and
2 Nike Hercules btys
1,000 M-47, M-4S and M-60 med tks; 400
M-113 and M-577 APC; 2,000 105 mm,
155 mm and 203 mm guns and how;
107 mm mor; 57 mm, 75 mm and 106 mm
RCL, Honest John SSM; Hawk and Nike
Hercules SAM

Reserves: 1,000,000

Navy: 20,000
7 destroyers
9 destroyer escorts (6 escort transports)
15 coastal escorts
22 patrol boats (less than 100 tons)
10 coastal minesweepers
20 landing ships (8 tank, 12 medium)
60 amphibious craft

Reserves: 33,000 Marines: 20,000 1 division Reserves: 60,000

Air Force: 25,000, 216 combat aircraft 11 FB sqns: 2 with 36 F-4C/D, 5 with 100 F-86F, 4 with 70 F-5A 1 recce sqn with 10 RF-5A

4 tpt sqns with 20 C-46, 12 C-54 and 12 C-123 15 hel, including 6 UH-19, 7 UH-1D/N Trainers incl 20 T-28, 20 T-33, 20 T-41, 14 F-5B

Reserves: 35,000

Para-Military Forces: A local defense militia, 2,000,000 Homeland Defense Reserve Force

Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea)

Population: 15,940,000
Military Service: Army 5 years, Navy and Air
Force 3-4 years
Total armed forces: 467,000
Estimated GNP (1972): \$3.5 bn
Defense expenditure (1974): 1,578 m won
(\$770m.) \$1 = 2.05 won

Army: 410,000

Reserves: 250,000

1 tank division
3 motorized divisions
20 infantry divisions
3 independent infantry brigades
3 SAM brigades with 180 SA-2
300 T-34, 700 T-54/-55 and T-59 med tks:
80 PT-76 and 50 T-62 lt tks; 200 BA-64,
BTR-40/-60/-152 APC; 200 SU-76 and
SU-100 SP guns; 3,000 guns and how up to
152 mm; 1,800 RI and 2,500 120 mm,
160 mm and 240 mm mor; 82 mm, 106 mm
RCL; 45 mm, 57 mm, 100 mm ATK guns;
12 FROG-5/-7 SSM; 2,500 AA guns, incl.
37mm, 57mm, ZSU-57, 85mm; SA-2 SAM

Navy: 17,000
8 submarines (4 ex-Soviet W-class, 4 ex-Chinese R-class)
15 submarine chasers (ex-Soviet SO/-class).
10 Komar and 8 Osa-class FPB with Styx SSM
54 MGB (15 Shanghai, 8 Swatow-class, 20 inshore)
90 torpedo boats (45 P-4, 30 P-6 class, ex-Soviet)

Air Force: 40,000; 588 combat aircraft 2 light bomber squadrons with 60 Il 28 13 FGA sqns with 28 Su-7 and 300 MiG-15/-17 16 fighter sqns with 150 MiG-21 and 40 MiG-19 1 recce sqn with 10 Il-28 Beagle 1 tpt regt with 150 An-2 1 tpt regt with 30 Mi-4 and 10 Mi-8 hel 70 Yak-18 and 59 MiG-15 and MiG-17 trainers

Reserves: 40,000

Para-Military Forces: 50,000 security forces and border guards; a civilian militia of 1,500,000 with small arms and some AA

² International Institute for Strategic Studies The Military Ralance, 1978/79, 1979

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The shift in the military balance from 1970 to 1977 is shown in Table 1.

When measured by firepower alone, the balance has shifted from rough parity in 1970 to a definite advantage for the North in 1977. Even before recent new intelligence studies, it was estimated that North Korea enjoyed a two-to-one advantage in both total mobile assault weapons (tanks, APCs, assault guns) and shelling capability (artillery, rocket launchers, and mortars). The North also enjoyed a two-to-one advantage in combat jet aircraft (although this is somewhat offset by qualitative inferiority) and a more than four-to-one advantage in anti-aircraft guns and navy combat vessels. A further breakdown of military strength made in 1978 is given in Table 2.

In addition, North Korea had almost nullified South Korea's active duty manpower advantage by 1978. This trend is apparently planned to continue, since the North Korean draft age has just been lowered to 16.

According to a report of the Pacific Study Group to the Senate Armed Forces Committee in January 1979, these data in fact underestimate the North Korean advantage. The report states that an intelligence reassessment "postulates a substantially larger and more offensively oriented North Korean military posture than heretofore assumed." Press reports based on new assessments credit the North

Table 1

MILITARY FORCE BALANCE COMPARISON

	1970		1977	
	Republic of Korea	North Korea	Republic of Korea	North Korea
Personnel				
Active forces	634,000	400,000	600,000	520,000
Reserve forces	1,000,000	1,200,000	3,000,000	2,000,000
Maneuver divisions	19	20	19	25
Ground balance				
Tanks	900	600	1,100ª	2,000
APC	300	1 20	400 ^a	750a
Assault guns	0	300	0	105ª
Anti-tank	NAb	NA	NA	24,000
Shelling capability Artillery/multiple		2 200	2 0008	4 2258
rocket launchers	1,750	3,300	2,000 ^a	4,335ª
Surface to surface		27.4	•	0.2
missiles (battalions)	NA	NA	1	2-3
Mortars	NA	NA	NA	9,000
Air balance				200
Jet combat aircraft	230	555	320 ^a	600
Other military aircraft	35a	130	200	400
AAA guns	850	2,000	2,000a	5,500a
SAMs (battalions/sites)	NA	NA	2	40-45
Navy Combat vessels	60	190	90-100	450-475

Source: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea, January 9, 1978, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1978.

^aThese are approximations; actual figures may be greater.

bNA = not available.

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Table 2

Comparison of Ground and Naval Forces, 1978

Component Ground Forces	North Korea	Republic of Korea
Active duty personnel	440,000	520,000
Combat divisions	25	20
Infantry	20	19
Motorized	3	0
Armor	2	1
Separate infantry brigades	4	
Separate armor regiments	5	$\begin{array}{c} 2 \\ 2 \end{array}$
Light infantry brigades	6-8	ō
Paramilitary/militia	2,500,000	2,800.000
Medium tanks	1,850	840
Light/amphibious tanks	100	0
Assault guns	100	ŏ
APCs	750	500
Field artillery pieces	3,000	2,000
Multiple rocket launchers	1,800	0
Mortars	9,000	5,300
Infantry anti-tank weapons	24,000	11,000
AAA weapons	5,500	700
SAM sites	38-40	33
Naval Forces		
Personnel	27,000	46,000
Bases	18	8
Total combatant ships	425-450	104
Patrol frigates	6-7	9
Missile attack boats	17-19	68
Coastal patrol	300	
Amphibious craft	90	18
Submarines	10-12	0

Source. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea, January 9, 1978, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1978.

with an army of 550,000 to 600,000 men and from 37 to 41 divisions, with a significantly larger and stronger armored force (more than 2,600 tanks and over 1,000 APCs), greater firepower (3,500 artillery pieces and 1,600 multiple rocket launchers), and substantially larger reserves capable of exploiting a "blitzkrieg" deep into the ROK.³

The North's superiority is not quite as pronounced as the numbers indicate, however, if assessed from the perspective of the respective missions of the two forces. The North Korean forces are configured largely for offensive operations and therefore must be assumed to require a distinct superiority. North Korea has developed highly mobile armed forces, supported by airborne elements. The element of surprise gives the North a distinct advantage, along with the advantage of geography. The South, on the other hand, is unable to trade distance for stronger defensive positions; it must defend all the major corridors of attack very close to

³ Sam Jameson, "U.S. Believes N. Korean Troops Outnumber the South's," Los Angeles Times, July 16, 1979, Sec. 1-A, p. 1-2.

the DMZ, which requires it to spread its defense forces. The North's emphasis on airborne operations and tunnel-digging is apparently designed to strengthen its capabilities for a surprise attack that would neutralize the DMZ defenses of the South.

The Humphrey-Glenn Senate Report summarized the respective military advantages of North and South Korea as follows:⁴

North Korea (generally offensive deployment)	South Korea (generally defensive deployment)
More ground combat divisions Greater ground firepower More armor assets Superior naval forces More air assets Better air defense system Larger logistics production Greater military production Capability of surprise Ability to concentrate attacking forces Distance to Seoul More commando-type forces Proximity of major allies	Advantage of terrain and defensive positions More modern air assets Better educated military leadership Vietnam combat experience Better transportation network Continued U.S. deterrence

Weighed against the ROK forces, the North has a clear military superiority which would be most effective in a short conflict aimed at controlling a limited area of the South extending down into the Seoul industrial belt. In a longer conflict, the South might be able to counterbalance this advantage, but at the probable cost of the destruction of major industrial and urban areas, a very high price.

The military advantages enjoyed by the South must also be weighed. The Northern armored forces have only limited corridors of attack open to them, affording the South terrain that is advantageous for defense. The South can focus its military effort on defensive capabilities designed to exploit favorable terrains and strong points. It also has superior aircraft with better trained manpower. Moreover, the South is backed by American deterrent forces, particularly air and naval forces that are far superior to comparable North Korean elements.

Prospective Balance. Both the South and the North are engaged in strengthening their military forces. While it is difficult to make projections of the North Korean buildup, the pattern of recent years indicates a continued strengthening of armored forces, increased artillery and other firepower, greater airborne strength, greater ammunition reserves, and a continued buildup of naval strength, particularly submarines. This buildup is almost entirely within the capability of the current North Korean defense industry. Additional strengthening of Northern forces would depend upon the Soviet Union for more technologically sophisticated weapons and upon the PRC and the Soviet Union for additional aircraft.

The North Korean forces have three potential vulnerabilities. First, their air

⁴ U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea, January 9, 1978, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1978, p. 28.

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force is equipped with aging jet aircraft, the most modern being MiG-21s and SU-7s. Second, North Korea has a manpower shortage, and the drafting of 16-year-olds is apparently affecting its industrial manpower pool. Finally, North Korea may not have enough trained technicians, which puts it at a disadvantage in the utilization of more sophisticated military technology.

The buildup of South Korean forces is likely to increase in the near future with the delivery of weapons systems ordered under the Force Improvement Plan (FIP), the transfer of equipment associated with the partial drawdown of U.S. Second Division forces, and the decision of the ROK to increase its defense expenditures as a result of the new estimates of North Korean military strength.

The FIP projects a five-year (1976-80) expenditure of about \$5.5 billion, with foreign exchange costs of \$3.5 billion. The equipment to be provided to ROK armed forces under the FIP includes the following:⁵

Army

Air defense equipment
Armor/antiarmor
Air mobility
Small arms/equipment improvement
Artillery
Communications
Surveillance equipment
Reserve projects

Navy

Vessels
Missiles and munitions
ASW aircraft
Communications
Base improvement
Equipment improvement
Reserve projects

Air Force

Aircraft
Early warning radar
Other radar
War reserve materiel and electronics
Communications and electronics
Air Force base/tactical construction
Other
Reserve projects

General

Equipment replacement

The present imbalances between the North and the South are likely to be reduced in the next five years. During this time, South Korea will substantially

⁵ Ibid., p. 45.

modernize its tank, anti-tank, and helicopter capabilities; its Air Force will benefit from both quantitative and qualitative improvements; and its firepower should be considerably enhanced by the additional artillery now projected. Nevertheless, the South will remain militarily inferior to the North.

The package of arms designed to compensate South Korea for the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces, estimated at a value of \$800 million, would have provided South Korea with additional mobility in the form of helicopters, APCs, and self-propelled mortar carriers; firepower in the form of new M-48A5 tanks, converted older M-48s, TOW launchers, Cobras, and howitzers; and anti-aircraft weapons, I-HAWK battalions, and Vulcan guns. The suspension of the Second Division's withdrawal will probably require the ROK to acquire many of these weapons by direct purchase, instead of at no cost.

The buildup plans will allow the ROK Army to assume a greater share of its own defense but will not provide sufficient offensive assets for the ROK to successfully attack North Korea.

Even if North Korea acquires only enough equipment to modernize its current inventory, it will still have a numerical advantage over South Korea in all key categories except APCs and SAM launchers by 1982. But U.S. analysts do not expect North Korean armament levels to stabilize. Rather, they anticipate a continuing buildup in all major categories except fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft guns. The prospect, therefore, is that the North will maintain its numerical advantage well into the 1980s, but the South can develop the capability to match that numerical advantage if it so chooses.

Defense Industry. At the present time, the North has clear advantages in the scale of its defense industry. It has the capacity to equip its ground and naval forces with all but the most sophisticated equipment and can produce massive numbers of tanks, APCs, mobile artillery, and smaller ground force weapons, as well as sufficient ammunition. Its submarine and gunboat output is increasing. It also has invested heavily in hardening and putting underground not only military but also industrial facilities.

The South, despite its stronger industrial base, has devoted far less of its GNP to developing an indigenous defense industry, and only in recent years has that industry expanded. At the present time, the ROK defense industry can meet only part of the requirements of its ground forces, and South Korea still imports almost all of its heavy equipment. It produces 105mm and 155mm artillery, mortars, M-16s, and smaller weapons; it has recently started a tank rebuilding program and is developing indigenous tank production; it has capabilities for maintenance of Hawk and Hercules missile systems and F-4 engines; it is engaged in coassembly of light helicopters; it produces a light manned armored vehicle; and it is increasing its capacity for ammunition production. It is now projecting co-production of F-5 arcraft. It has only a limited ability to support its naval forces, producing patrol craft that are equipped with imported weapons, electronics, and engines. It must depend upon external resources for all sophisticated equipment, as well as for aircraft (until the F-5 program is in production) and electronic gear. By the mid or early 1980s, however, South Korea should be able to produce a far larger percentage of its ground force weapons, including tanks and helicopters. Nevertheless, it will depend upon external sources for sophisticated fire control and other electronic equipment for many years. The South also plans to develop a capacity for building

and constructing its own frigates, but these will have to be equipped with imported weapons and other gear.

Projecting current and planned capacity, the North is likely to maintain its defense industry advantage, although it will be far less pronounced in the 1980s than it is at present. The South does have a capacity for considerably upgrading its defense industry, but only at the cost of decreased investment in the non-military industrial sector, which would have consequent effects on its economy. Furthermore, any investment in defense industry must always be weighed against the cost of such equipment purchased abroad. Assuming that the United States continues to be a reliable supplier, it is questionable whether the South should invest heavily in much of the more sophisticated equiment its forces will require. However, its defense industry could be expanded in less sophisticated areas of technology which would be economical and would improve the South's indigenous base of support.

External Support. Both South and North Korea are dependent on external support for their defense forces, but the South is considerably more dependent than the North. The North Korean Air Force has received MiG-21s, helicopters, and light transport aircraft (primarily from the PRC), and the Soviet Union is apparently supplying the more sophisticated electronic and surface-to-air equipment, although the flow of Soviet material has probably decreased considerably in recent years.

South Korea receives large amounts of equipment for all its armed forces, and its air and naval forces are almost completely dependent upon external sources. Sophisticated ground force equipment, including armored vehicles, tank parts, anti-tank guns, longer-range artillery, electronic equipment, and communication equipment, is supplied almost totally from U.S. sources. Foreign exchange expenditures for ROK defense forces have increased to about \$600 million to \$750 million annually. Furthermore, the South depends upon U.S.-funded ammunition reserves stockpiled in the ROK. It has voiced complaints regarding U.S. failures to deliver highly sophisticated equipment, such as the Lance missile, but the South's access problem is not as serious as that faced by the North.

It is likely that the 1980s will see increasing pressures from both North and South Korea on their respective allies to supply more sophisticated equipment. The North is likely to increase pressure on the Soviet Union for the delivery of MiG-23s, and Soviet restraint about delivery of more sophisticated aircraft might not continue under these circumstances. The motivations for Soviet restraint are not entirely clear, but it appears that the Soviet Union is prepared to support only North Korea's defensive capabilities, although it will not inhibit the development of offensive capabilities on the ground. Some have conjectured that Soviet constraints reflect a desire to avoid an arms race in Korea. However, the pace of the North Korean military buildup and the support it has received from both the Soviet Union and the PRC would indicate that neither was acting with consistent restraint or in response to U.S. levels of support for the ROK. In fact, there is good reason to presume that Soviet constraints are essentially politically motivated and that a more evenhanded North Korean policy vis-à-vis the two communist powers may be the price of MiG-23s or other advanced equipment. It is likely that at some point within the next five years North Korea will be equipped with more advanced aircraft supplied by the Soviet Union, while its numerical advantages will be maintained by replacement of the MiG-15/17s with MiG-21s from the PRC.

South Korea is likely to continue to have more extensive external support, presumably from the United States. However, Seoul has tried to diversify its sources of military supply, in a limited way and with mixed success. American military equipment is preferred because such equipment is interchangeable with that held by the U.S. forces in Korea, and U.S. logistic backstopping, including spare parts, is considered far superior to that of other suppliers. Furthermore, the South Korean armed forces are familiar with U.S. military equipment and have found it reliable over the years. On the other hand, if a superior weapon system is available from another Western supplier, or if the United States decides to deny certain systems, other sources—particularly the French, British, and Germans—are available and in fact anxious to meet Korean needs. The ROK no longer has serious foreign exchange problems inhibiting purchases of equipment from other sources, and those sources have proved willing to provide generous financing; thus foreign exchange shortages will not be a constraint for Seoul.

The United States may find that its major problems in supporting the South Korean force buildup will involve decisions about providing more sophisticated weapon systems, particularly missiles and advanced aircraft. Denial of these systems to South Korea would increase reliance on U.S. armed forces and could also result in the ROK seeking other sources of supply or developing domestic industries. On the other hand, there are strong arguments for maintaining a ceiling on the level of sophistication to avoid unnecessarily escalating the arms race on the Peninsula. Current U.S. arms sales policies also establish constraints on the overall level of equipment that can be sold to Korea within each year. Although the arms sales policy is to be applied on a case-by-case basis with some exceptions granted, its application to South Korea is questionable. A strong case can be made to except Korea from the policy, just as NATO, Japan, and ANZUS are excepted.

Economic Factors. Comparisons of the relative strength of South and North Korea often ignore fundamental economic and political considerations. The military inferiority of the South is clearly not reflected in the relative strengths of the two economies. The South Korean economy is far stronger than the North's, and this advantage is likely to increase as South Korea's industrial base—its steel, heavy machinery, petrochemical, and electronic industries—expands rapidly. Its shipbuilding capacity is also much greater than that of the North and is likely to expand. Furthermore, its current account balance and its high credit rating provide sufficient foreign exchange to support the development of both its economy and its defense infrastructure.

The North, on the other hand, faces increasingly serious economic problems, with major deficits in its current account balance and a heavy external debt not only to its communist supporters but also to the West. Moreover, the economic growth potential of the North is limited, as is its flexibility in terms of independent choices for the purchase of weapons systems.

Some indication of the relative growth potential of the two economies can be found in Figs. 1 through 4. They demonstrate the major shift in economic capability and development from the North to the South during the 1970s and the contrast between the relatively static North Korean projections for the years ahead and the continued high level of growth anticipated in the South. Given the inadequacy of reliable data on the North, and according to reports of observers in North Korea, these charts may overestimate North Korean Gross National Product (GNP), per capita GNP in particular.




Fig. 1—Gross National Product





Fig. 2-Per capita Gross National Product

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Korea: The Economic Race Between the North and the South, January 1978.




Note: The average annual rate of growth during 1966-76 was 14 percent for North Korea and 23 percent for South Korea. The industrial output index numbers for 1976 (1965 = 100) were 422 and 975, respectively.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Korea: The Economic Race Between the North and the South, January 1978.

Fig. 3—Industrial growth

Comparisons of the two economies can be deceptive, however. The North has demonstrated a willingness to allocate a far larger percentage of its resources to defense than has the South. While accurate figures are lacking, it is likely that North Korea's real military expenditures remain equal to, if not greater than, those of the South. North Korea spends upwards of 20 percent of its GNP on defense, compared with an average of a little over 6 percent for the South in recent years. Twelve percent of the North Korean working-age male population is in the regular armed forces, as compared with only 6 percent in the South; and the relative proportion of the North's work force in the defense industry is even higher. The North has made a total commitment and has given absolute priority to its military effort; and so far it has been able to deprive its civilian economy without serious internal problems.



Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, Korea: The Economic Race Between the North and the South, January 1978.

Fig. 4—Trade

On the other hand, the North may be reaching a critical point where it will have to reallocate both financial and manpower resources to the civilian sector in order to prevent a serious breakdown in its economy. Heavy capital inputs would seem to be required if the economy is to continue to grow. These inputs must come either from external sources—particularly the Soviet Union—or from a reallocation of internal resources. One critical factor will be the willingness of the Soviets to bail out the North Korean economy in the near term, and whether the Soviet Union will call for a reallocation of resources from defense to the civilian economy in return. Such a reallocation would have very important implications for the prospects of tension-reduction measures on the Korean Peninsula. Another factor will be the North's capacity to increase its foreign exchange earnings, which has recently been improving. That the North is selling military equipment overseas is a measure of its economic problems.

An alternative for the North is to move militarily against the South before the combination of its declining economic strength and the growing military potential of the South preclude such an option. An early offensive, even if only partially successful, could destroy much of the South's industry and overcome the North's growing economic disadvantage. Yet North Korea's industrial structure is vulnerable to U.S. air attacks, making its assessment of America's will to defend the South critical in the deterrence equation.

None of the choices faced by the North are inviting, and all require the revision of its current economic policies. The North will probably seek to defer its decision as long as possible, but within the next few years it must decide whether to reallocate resources from military to economic investment and/or seek major external assistance (probably only from the Soviet Union), or face a declining economy and a growing Southern military potential, or strike against the South. Paradoxically, at this juncture, the risk of hostilities could increase while the opportunity for achieving a reduction of tension was also improving.

Political Balance. The two Korean states have significantly different political systems. The North Korean government is totalitarian, exerting perhaps the most rigid controls over the lives of its people of any communist nation. The South Korean government is authoritarian, with a good deal of freedom granted the population, particularly in the economic and social aspects of life. Both governments are able to command the loyalty and support of their citizenry in support of their defense and other military efforts. There is no reason to question this support in the North; and in the South there is considerable voluntary support for defense, not only because of the material benefits accruing to the average South Korean from the economic sector and the relative equity of the income distribution, but also because of the bitter memories of North Korean outrages during its occupation of a large sector of the South. A 20 percent defense surtax, for example, was imposed in 1975 without complaint in the South.

There are some doubts as to whether both governments will be able to generate the same level of discipline and support for high defense expenditures and for universal military service in the next decade. The problem could be more pronounced in the South, especially as per capita income rapidly expands. The Korean Development Institute projects an increase in per capita income to over \$4,000, and popular interest in more consumer goods over the next decade will increase the difficulty of levying the same level of sacrifice for defense as in the past. In the

North, very little is known about public attitudes, since the government makes every effort to suppress dissent. But one can conjecture that the failure of the civilian economy to improve living standards might lead to widespread dissent.

Perhaps the critical unknown is the effect that changes in leadership in North as well as South Korea will have in the 1980s. Active opposition and continued student problems in the South resulting from the assassination of President Park could affect stability and support for defense, while the North may have even more serious problems should a family succession be imposed by Kim Il-sung.

Kim's efforts to establish a clearcut line of family succession have apparently not succeeded. A leadership fight or the emergence of a collegial leadership could force the North to turn inward and revise both its economic and external policies. One possibility could be an effort to allocate greater resources to the economy, making a reduction of tension—even a temporary reduction—more desirable. A shift in the North's position regarding the two-Koreas issue and other tension-reduction measures could result. Another possibility might be a heightening of tensions and the utilization of this threat to unify the North while it is experiencing leadership problems. The one relatively certain factor is that the succession in the North is likely to introduce new fluidity into the Korean situation.

The politics of the South are likely to become more complicated and less prone to tight central control in the 1980s, given the almost revolutionary changes that are occurring in the economic and social structure of the country. Nevertheless, the present broad public support for effective defense measures against the North is not likely to be seriously diluted. Succession in the South will likewise add an element of fluidity and uncertainty. There is clear evidence that the North believes it missed its golden opportunity to move against the South during the period in 1960 when President Syngman Rhee was overthrown by student demonstrators. There is always the danger that it may strike against the South if it perceives the levels of dissent to be greater than they really are, especially if Kim Il-sung feels he has little to lose in a "now or never" situation.

Thus, both North and South Korea are likely to face leadership problems in the 1980s. Neither has a clear line of succession, and the likelihood of increased political instability at leadership levels until a new political equilibrium is established will result in increased temptation to both North and South to provoke a conflict.

Both Koreas will be under strong pressure to consolidate a new leadership rapidly, if only to forestall any temptation to intervene on the part of the adversary. New leadership, particularly in the North, would also open opportunities for a relaxation of past pressures and negotiation of a two-Korea accommodation. Kim Il-sung's departure could open the way for a reassessment of economic policies, if not already undertaken, to give the new leadership time to consolidate and seek popular support. The South is less likely to experience any change in basic policy, but new leadership will likewise be able to move away from past rigidities in policy.

Conclusion. North Korea is clearly superior to South Korea in purely military strength, while South Korea has by far the stronger economy. The potential of the South to upgrade its defense effort is greater than that of the North, although to do so would entail allocating greater resources to defense, with consequent economic costs. The North, with its limited resources, its smaller population, and its weaker economy, has nonetheless mobilized a greater defense effort, but its military advantage is likely to decline in the future. Furthermore, the North, while having a larger defense industry, is less certain about external support than the

South and has less financial resources to increase this support. The North's military superiority provides it with a capability to achieve an initial thrust to the Han River and, with the capture of the Seoul area, to control a high percentage of the population and industrial capacity of the South. The North Korean threat is real, ever-present, potentially growing, and certainly not a "paper tiger."

However, the North has vulnerabilities that could become more pronounced in the 1980s. Its domestic economy may be reaching the outer limits of support for the military effort, and its dependence on external support is therefore likely to increase. The Soviet Union will be at an advantage in such a situation, since its resources—both economic and technological—are far greater than those of China. The Soviet Union, therefore, could conceivably play the more critical role in the evolution of North Korean policy toward the Korean Peninsula in the 1980s.

The probability of leadership changes in both North and South will increase in the coming decade, opening up the possibility of political instability in both and a major policy reassessment in the North. The North could be faced with choices of seeking a relaxation of tensions to permit reallocation of resources to civilian economic development, watching the South gain military superiority, or even attacking the South to nullify its growing economic and technological advantages.

The possibility of nuclear proliferation, particularly on the part of the South, also cannot be ignored, even though the ROK adheres today to a policy of nonproliferation. South Korea, with its expanding nuclear energy production, will have a growing potential for nuclear warhead development. Furthermore, research and development in missiles will provide the basis for a nuclear weapons delivery system. The North so far lacks a similar potential. An effort by either side to acquire a nuclear weapons system would have the most destabilizing effect on the North-South equation of any development in the 1980s. It could easily work to the advantage of the non-nuclear state, since it could lead to preemptive action by the major powers. For example, the Soviet Union and China might act if the South reversed its non-proliferation policy; and in addition, the South would jeopardize American support. Since it is virtually impossible to develop nuclear weapons secretly, the proliferating state would be faced with punitive countermeasures even before its weapons program was completed. Thus the prospect of a destabilizing nuclear weapons program by either North or South Korea during the 1980s is slim, but it still cannot be totally ignored.

U.S. Force Levels

Current Levels. At the present time, there are approximately 40,000 American troops stationed in Korea. The major elements of these forces are the Second Infantry Division, less one battalion withdrawn at the end of 1978; the 314th Air Division, with 72 combat aircraft; Army missile and air defense commands; and associated logistic, intelligence, communications, and support units. Reinforcements for these military units in nearby areas are Marine ground and air assets, an Air Force Wing in Japan, B-52s in Guam, and the Seventh Fleet, which provides for the naval defense of Korea, and additional airpower. Finally, U.S. capabilities to bring air forces quickly from the United States provide another important deterrent.

⁶ See discussion of this issue by Leslie Gelb, especially pp. 263, and 227 below.

The major U.S. forces have three missions: (1) to compensate for the deficiencies and vulnerabilities of the ROK forces; (2) to provide a major deterrent to North Korean attack and an incentive for the USSR and the PRC to counsel restraint; and (3) through the U.N. command, to provide an overall command structure and supervision of the peace-keeping machinery provided for in the Armistice Agreement.

The more specific war-fighting capabilities of the U.S. forces include (1) a highly mobile reserve armor and anti-armor capability which offsets South Korean deficiencies and reinforces its defense lines; (2) airpower capable of gaining air superiority and providing vital tactical air support; (3) experienced air controllers who can direct air strikes; (4) intelligence gathering and analysis to maximize the prospects for early warning; (5) a base of operations for reinforcement of ground, naval, and air forces from outside South Korea as well as an ability to call in these forces on an emergency basis; (6) effective communication and logistic support, including the availability of war reserve ammunition held by the U.S. forces; (7) training for the ROK; and (8) a source of key equipment transfers. These capabilities not only make up for deficiencies in the ROK forces relative to those of the North, they also make possible a forward defense strategy designed to keep the military action as far from Seoul as possible.

The deterrent mission of U.S. forces is performed in various ways. The presence of American troops on the Korean Peninsula provides a "tripwire," warning the North Koreans that an attack against South Korea would involve not only South Korean forces but U.S. military power as well. The Second Division, even though in reserve posture, would undoubtedly be involved in fighting very shortly after the outset of conflict and thus serves as one form of "tripwire." The 314th Air Division is likely to be even more quickly involved due to the central command role played by the U.S. Air Commander in the air defense of Korea and the necessity of defending U.S. airbases near the DMZ at the outset of any conflict. Furthermore, the U.S. commander, by virtue of his role as both U.N. commander and commander of combined U.S. and ROK forces, would be immediately involved.

Deterrence, however, constitutes more than the prospective reaction of U.S. forces to a North Korean attack. Deterrence, in the last analysis, rests on North Korea's perception of that reaction. The North Koreans have shown great respect for American military power and have reacted with evident concern to exercises in which U.S. air and naval forces have been brought in from outside Korea. The U.S. nuclear capability is particularly feared by the North and serves as a deterrent, whether based in South Korea or not. These perceptions, however, can change, both as a function of North Korean views and as a function of the perceptions of South Korea, Japan, and the rest of Asia concerning the reliability of the American commitment. Should these countries perceive the U.S. commitment as wavering, the judgment of the North will inevitably be affected. Uncertainty regarding the American commitment thus both encourages North Korean offensive proclivities and discourages South Korean dependence upon the United States.

When the case for ground force withdrawal is based upon limiting U.S. involvement in a future conflict and leaving open the option of non-involvement, it impacts upon the North Korean assessment of America's will, not its capability, to defend Korea. It potentially encourages North Korean aggressive tendencies and paradoxically could increase the risk that the U.S. forces remaining in Korea could be involved in conflict.

The third role of the U.S. forces, maintaining the Armistice and commanding the joint forces, is more significant than is readily apparent. While many of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement have been violated or are unenforceable, the truce-keeping machinery under the U.S. commander does maintain an internationally recognized border between the North and the South, making any move by either force across the DMZ readily apparent. Moreover, it provides machinery for negotiations with the North relating to major incidents, as was the case, for example, with the Pueblo incident of 1968 and the more recent tree-cutting incident in the Joint Security Area, when new provisions for controlling that area were negotiated. Finally, the U.S. command role provides a means of controlling reactions to North Korean incidents in a manner that can be both firm and non-provocative, as was the case in the tree-cutting incident and in the North Korean attack on a U.S. helicopter that strayed over the DMZ in 1977. The U.S. command and presence provides an additional safeguard against an (unlikely) attack by South Korea as well as a basis for expanding the peace-keeping machinery should the North be prepared to do so.

Reduction of U.S. Forces. In 1977, withdrawal of American ground forces from South Korea was projected to take place in three phases. Initially, one brigade of the Second Division and some other support units totaling 6,000 men were to be withdrawn in 1978-79. In the second phase, in 1980, logistic and other support units including the surface-to-air defense command, totaling 9,000 men, were to be withdrawn. In the final phase, in 1981-82, the remaining two brigades and the division headquarters would be withdrawn. The United States planned to maintain augmented air, intelligence, and communications units in Korea indefinitely.

These plans for the withdrawal were made with a view to minimizing its potential adverse effect on the U.S. commitment to Korea. The transfer of some \$800 million worth of American equipment now largely held by the withdrawing forces, in combination with preexisting ROK plans for its own force improvement, were to assure that the military deficiencies and vulnerabilities now compensated for by U.S. forces would be filled by the reinforced Korean military. As the prior analysis pointed out, however, North Korea is likely to retain its military superiority, particularly with anticipated North Korean force improvements.

Larger questions, however, remained concerning the potential effect of withdrawal on the U.S. deterrent power. The perceptions of North Korea and of the other Asian countries have an important bearing on whether U.S. deterrence is respected; thus a very unstable situation could be created if the ground force withdrawal were perceived to reduce the risk of U.S. involvement in a new Korean conflict. Concerns throughout Asia regarding a greatly reduced U.S. deterrent were in fact moderated by subsequent developments, including the attenuation of the withdrawal, the decision to leave two-thirds of the Second Division in Korea at least until 1981-82, the augmentation of the air elements, the establishment of the U.S.-ROK Combined Force Command, and the increase in the scale and frequency of joint exercises. But those concerns remained at least until the withdrawal was suspended.

Finally, maintaining the U.S.-commanded joint structure would be more difficult in the absence of U.S. ground forces. The withdrawal would also raise doubts about the future of the Armistice machinery and the U.S. capability for moderating reactions to violent incidents in the DMZ and elsewhere.

Reacting to Asian concerns, particularly those of the ROK and Japan, and Congressional pressures, the Carter Administration committed itself initially to a review of the ground force withdrawal in two specific contexts. That review began in the spring of 1979. The joint statement of the Tenth U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting in July 1977 contains a commitment for continuing consultations with South Korea on the development of Korean capabilities, the military balance, and other factors affecting peace and security in the region to assure that "the deterrent to North Korean aggression remains strong." In addition, the Congress, in providing authorization for the transfer of military equipment, established a requirement for assuring that withdrawal can be accomplished with minimum risk. Specifically, the Congressional authorization stated:

- (d) The President should also transmit to the Congress, 120 days prior to each phase of troop withdrawal, a report on the viability of the withdrawal. This report should include assessments of the military balance on the Korean Peninsula, the impact of withdrawal on the military balance, the adequacy of United States military assistance to the Republic of Korea command structure, Republic of Korea defensive fortifications and defense industry development, the United States reinforcement capability and the progress of diplomatic efforts to reduce tension in the area.
- (e) (1) It is the sense of the Congress that further withdrawal of ground forces of the United States from the Republic of Korea may seriously risk upsetting the military balance in that region and requires full advance consultation with the Congress.
- (2) Prior to any further withdrawal, the President shall report to the Congress on the effect of any proposed withdrawal plan on preserving deterrence in Korea, the reaction anticipated from North Korea, the effect of the plan on increasing incentives for the Republic of Korea to develop an independent nuclear deterrent, the effect of any withdrawal on our long-term military and economic partnership with Japan, the effect of any proposed withdrawal on the United States-Chinese and United States-Soviet military balance, and the possible implications of any proposed withdrawal on the Soviet-Chinese military situation.⁷

On July 20, 1979, after President Carter had visited Korea, the combination of local Asian concerns, increasing Congressional pressures, and the new assessment of larger North Korean military strength led President Carter to reverse his ground force withdrawal decision. The July 20 Presidential announcement stated that the further withdrawal of the Second Division is "to remain in abeyance," and that some support units, including the I-Hawk Air Defense Battalion, will depart Korea, but further withdrawal will be examined in 1981 taking into account not only the North-South military balance but progress toward a reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Three considerations were cited as the basis for the decision: (1) the new estimates of North Korean military strength; (2) U.S.-ROK plans to seek negotiations with the North announced during the Carter visit; and (3) the need to reassure American allies in Asia, given the growth of Soviet military power and "conflict and new uncertainties in Southeast Asia."

The announcement suspending the troop withdrawals is significant in two respects: for recognizing the psychological aspects of deterrence, specifically the need

⁷ Conference Report on International Security Assistance Act of 1978. U.S. House of Representatives Report No. 95-1546, Sec. 23, September 7, 1978.

to avoid conveying misleading impressions to the North, and for linking further reduction not only to the military balance but also to "a reduction of tensions" on the Peninsula. The critical U.S. role in the deterrence equation is not only preserved but strengthened by the July 1979 decision; and hopefully the process of erosion of Asian confidence in the U.S. security commitment will be reversed.

Japan

Japan's role in the deterrence equation is far less direct than that of either the United States or South Korea, but not much less vital. The Japanese do not contribute military forces to the defense of Korea and should not be expected to do so in the foreseeable future. The memories of the past are still too vivid for Korea to welcome a direct Japanese military role, even if Japan were prepared to undertake such a mission. On the other hand, Japan not only has an important stake in continuing stability on the Korean Peninsula, it also has by its policies the means to undermine the deterrence equation. Japan has several positive roles to play in Korean security. First and foremost, it provides a base structure (for air, naval, and logistics forces) that is essential to the support of the U.S. military forces in Korea. Various understandings provide for this support; and Prime Minister Sato, in the Okinawa Reversion Settlement, accepted the vital importance of Korea to Japan's security and affirmed Japan's preparedness to respond promptly and positively when consulted on use of bases in defense of Korea. Second, Japan can provide positive intelligence and logistic support to South Korean forces. Third, Japan's ability to control its communist-leaning Korean population is potentially critical. Finally, Japan's economic support for and relationship with the ROK plays a positive role in South Korea's overall security position.

For the future, Japan's continuing political support for the ROK will be required, particularly in avoidance of the temptation to succumb to North Korean lures. Also, trade issues between South Korea and Japan are likely to become more complex and potentially disruptive. Finally, Japan might take a larger and more direct role in deterrence throught the provision of weapons or defense-related equipment if its own defense inhibitions soften. But the fundamental factor will be Japan's willingness to provide all support short of military forces to the broad deterrence equation.

Other Deterrent Factors

As has been noted, while the United States can exercise a large measure of positive control over both its own and ROK capabilities, it has no such control over the roles of the PRC and the USSR and the effectiveness of the truce-keeping machinery. These factors can be influenced by U.S. actions, but the decisions rest basically in the hands of the North Koreans, the Soviets, and the Chinese.

Over the years, both the PRC and the USSR have exercised restraint over North Korea's aggressive tendencies for reasons of their own national interest. Particularly at the present time, renewed conflict in Korea would greatly disrupt China's plans for economic modernization. Chinese relations with the West and the United States have priority over support for North Korean goals, and stability in East Asia generally serves Chinese interests. Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing) made this goal abundantly clear in his travels to Japan and Southeast

Asia in late 1978. Similarly, the Soviet Union has no apparent wish to undermine the SALT talks or prospects for détente with the United States which would likely result from active support for North Korean aggressiveness. Furthermore, neither the Soviet Union nor the PRC wishes to devote the major resources necessary to support a conflict in Korea, given their concerns about each other and competing resource demands from their own economies and military establishments. Their willingness to cooperate and support North Korea in a conflict would be at most minimal.

As a consequence, both the Soviet Union and the PRC exercise a degree of restraint upon the North. Following the shooting down of an American EC-121 aircraft in the spring of 1969, the Soviets sent a high-level delegation to Pyongyang with very clear indications that its mission was to warn the North Koreans not to attempt further tests of America's willingness to fulfill its commitment to the ROK, despite its preoccupation with the Vietnam War. The Chinese exercised similar restraint in April 1975 when Kim Il-sung visited Beijing. Kim arrived in the Chinese capital trumpeting the call for unification without qualifications, apparently looking for support for military action against South Korea and a United States that was weak and divided by the Vietnam War. The Chinese responded by pointedly emphasizing peaceful unification and encouraging Kim to focus his effects on broadening support in the non-aligned bloc where Beijing presumably expected him to be discouraged from a military adventure. The only concession made by the Chinese was the acceptance of the North as the sole legitimate government of Korea, an honor previously reserved for the South in successive U.N. resolutions.

More recently, Deng Xiaoping, during visits to Tokyo in the fall of 1978 and Washington in January 1979, sought to alleviate any anxiety regarding North Korean intentions. The Soviets have shown their restraint by repeatedly failing to parrot the North Korean line and by stressing the need for peaceful unification. During the 1976 tree-cutting incident, both the Soviet Union and the PRC were very careful not to endorse in any way the North Korean action. During the negotiations of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) regarding the new arrangements for the Joint Security Area, the Chinese raised the level of their representation on the MAC and made apparent their interest in a quick settlement of the issue.

The United States has a limited capability for influencing Beijing and Moscow by emphasizing its concerns over potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula and its intention to fulfill its commitment to the South. Efforts by the United States to maintain a significant and visible deterrent also provide the USSR and the PRC with the necessary rationale to warn North Korea not to challenge or test the United States. Both possess the intelligence capabilities that the North lacks to provide information on the actual and potential retaliatory power of the United States, reinforcing Pyongyang's concerns. By the same token, plans for U.S. force withdrawals could have worked negatively in terms of the capability of the communist powers to restrain the North.

Both Moscow and Beijing have, however, established the fact that their influence over the North is limited. While they have been active in restraining Kim Il-sung's proclivities for offensive actions, they have clearly made no effort to pressure him to adopt measures that would reduce tensions and stabilize North-South relations. The Chinese could, for example, play a more active role in supervising the Armistice. Kim Il-sung would undoubtedly resist such pressures to the point

of turning his back on whichever of his allies exercised them. Neither Moscow nor Beijing seems willing to risk such alienation at the present time.

The weakest link in the deterrence equation is the current U.N. peace-keeping machinery under the Armistice Agreement. Most of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement are either inoperative, violated, or ignored. The DMZ is impregnated by major military installations on both sides, including hardened fortifications; joint inspection of incidents is rejected by the North; even the military demarcation line is poorly marked, raising the danger of patrols from both sides drifting across the boundary. The Chinese have adopted an inactive, observer role in this area.

The Final Balance on Deterrence

The prospects for Korean peace in the 1980s depend upon maintaining the deterrence equation and calculating the variables in it. For example, a further withdrawal of American ground forces would have reduced the capacity of the USSR and the PRC to restrain the North and necessitated the strengthening of ROK forces. On the other hand, plans for a major buildup of South Korean forces could likewise unbalance the equation, providing the North with a rationale for seeking far greater support from its allies, particularly in the form advanced weapons systems for defense, if not for a preemptive strike against the South.

Should South Korea decide to develop its own damage-inflicting deterrent force with advanced missiles and nuclear warheads, the deterrence equation would very likely be destabilized. The North might choose to launch a preemptive strike at the very moment when U.S.-ROK relations would have deteriorated over the proliferation issue and before the South had fully developed its own deterrent capability.

The interrelationships between the domestic defense industries of both North and South Korea and external sources of military support are another key element in the equation. Denial of weapons systems to the South places greater obligation on the United States to maintain such systems in the ROK under its unilateral control, thus potentially constraining the U.S. capability to reduce its forces.

With the many uncertainties in the deterrence equation, stability in the military balance between North and South in the 1980s is by no means assured. The equation is bound to change, if only as a result of South Korean military modernization, the continued North Korean buildup, and anticipated pressures from both Koreas on their allies for more sophisticated weaponry. The United States will face a series of critical decisions whose implications for other factors in the deterrence equation will need careful evaluation. The most basic decision, as discussed earlier, concerns the plans for withdrawing all or part of the remaining elements of the Second Division, which are now held in abeyance until 1981. A failure of the North to negotiate any reduction in tensions, which must be assumed for the present, will raise questions as to whether the United States should give up a negotiating card by withdrawing even if a military balance between North and South is attained.

Other key decisions relate to the transfer of more sophisticated military equipment: the level of total U.S. sales, given present overall global limits, and the degree of support for the South's defense industry. Just as important will be decisions relating to the priority Korea is given in overall U.S. relationships with the PRC and the USSR; and to how much emphasis the United States should place on the need for Sino-Soviet measures, taken separately, to restrain North Korea and to pressure it to accept measures that would stabilize North-South relations. In this

connection, the prospects for increasing South Korean economic and military strength might convince the communist powers that it would be to their advantage to maintain Korean security in the 1980s by greater restraint on the North and by new steps to reduce tensions. Or those powers might consider their interests sufficiently threatened by the South Korean buildup to give the North more leeway for action.

Perhaps the greatest uncertainty in the deterrence equation is North Korea's reaction to its economic and technological deficiences. While the North has the capacity to improve its defense capabilities in the short term and maintain a clear military superiority over the South, its longer-term prospects are far less favorable. During the 1980s, the greater and growing economic power of the South and its technological advantages provide the basis for gradually developing military superiority over the North. The crossover point could occur by the mid to late 1980s. The closer the crossover point gets, the less latitude the North has to defer a decision on its course of action.

Thus, U.S. decisions on force reduction and arms supply must take full account of the uncertainty regarding long-term North Korean policy. The deferral of withdrawal plans and a judicious strengthening of South Korean military capabilities without tipping the deterrence equation too rapidly in favor of the South are likely to force an earlier decision by the North and render unacceptably costly the option of a preemptive strike. The prospects for a reduction in tensions should likewise increase if Soviet support were made conditional upon a reallocation of domestic North Korean resources from military to economic goals. The 1980s, therefore, are likely to see significant changes in the deterrence equation, resulting from the strengthening of the South and from new policy decisions forced upon the North. The United States has within its capability the power to influence these changes and to increase the prospects for a more stable and secure situation in Korea.

BEYOND DETERRENCE: THE NEGOTIATING ALTERNATIVE

Past Efforts at Negotiation

The choice in Korea lies essentially between preserving the military balance in a manner that deters conflict or seeking to stabilize the current division of the country via political measures in a manner that reduces tensions between North and South. When the Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953, it provided that a political conference would be arranged to negotiate a final settlement endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly. The goals of the conference were to be negotiation of a final peace treaty and unification of Korea. Neither objective has been achieved, and over the years a wide variety of negotiating efforts have proved fruitless.

The history of international negotiating efforts on Korea dates from the Geneva Conference in 1954. The Geneva Conference was called as a result of an agreement between the Big Four foreign ministers reached at Berlin on February 18, 1954, to convene a meeting of the participants in the Korean War, including representatives of both the Soviet Union and the PRC. The conference broke down when it became clear that there was no basis for consensus on either unification of Korea or a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

Negotiations subsequently took place at the Mixed Armistice Commission and at the United Nations. The Armistice Commission sought to enforce the terms of the Armistice Agreement, including control over the introduction of weapons into Korea and monitoring the DMZ. It failed to implement most of the provisions of the Agreement, although it did prove useful in settling a few major disputes.

Negotiations relating to unification of Korea took place at the United Nations, where the Korean item was a major Cold War issue in successive General Assembly sessions for many years. Prior to 1975, a resolution favoring South Korea was able to achieve majority support, but that majority gradually shrank. In 1975, two resolutions were passed, one supporting the South and the other supporting the North's position. Until the early 1970s, the General Assembly supported the position that South Korea was the sole legitimate government on the Peninsula and would not recognize the existence of two Koreas. Efforts to bring the ROK alone into the United Nations were frustrated by the Soviet veto, while earlier Soviet efforts to bring in the two Koreas were frustrated by the United States, under pressure from the ROK. In 1971, however, the ROK switched its position and accepted the temporary existence of two Koreas and dual admission into the United Nations. But by this time, the Soviet Union, the PRC, and North Korea refused to accept the admission of both Koreas.

The U.N. experience was an exercise in frustration, requiring increasing amounts of diplomatic pressure on the part of the United States, the ROK, and the West to maintain even a bare majority in support of the South. It proved largely unsuccessful in advancing the prospects for peace and unification, and was largely a divisive Cold War exercise, with the sole exception of a consensus resolution introduced with Chinese support in 1973 abolishing UNCURK⁸ and urging various steps to reduce tension.

The Korean issue has been dropped by the General Assembly for the past three years, relieving some nations of the need to press for votes and others of the need to make choices they wished to avoid. Abstention was clearly welcomed by the neutral nations.

In 1975, the United States proposed a four-power conference of the two Koreas, the PRC, and the United States as a forum for resolution of the Korean issue and a step toward stabilizing the status quo and reducing tensions on the Peninsula. This proposal was summarily rejected by North Korea and the PRC.

Various intermediaries have since sought to arrange talks in Korea, as well as trying to convince North Korea to look to the German formula as a model for Korea. Former Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan and Prime Minister Ceaucescu of Romania pushed for a two-power, U.S.-North Korean conference in talks with the United States. President Tito of Yugoslavia tried to advance a three-power meeting, which the North never accepted. East German Chairman Honnecker during a visit to Pyongyang suggested trying the two-Germany formula, but this concept was rejected by Pyongyang. The North, in turn, has been pushing its own proposal for bilateral U.S.-North Korean talks that would not include the ROK. All of these efforts to resolve the Korean issue, however, have failed.

The most recent international negotiating initiative was launched during President Carter's visit to Seoul, when the United States and the ROK proposed trilateral talks among senior officials of the United States and both Koreas "to seek means

⁸ The United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

to promote dialogue and reduce tensions in the area." Trilateral talks had been opposed in the past by the South. Despite some optimism in Washington, based in part on U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim's talks in Pyongyang during the late spring, North Korea rejected the proposal as "utterly infeasible," sticking to its refusal to accept the South as an equal participant in negotiations on a peace agreement.

The other major negotiating approach has been direct talks between the two Koreas. In 1971, negotiations commenced at the Red Cross level and then moved on to the political level, resulting in the July 4, 1972, joint declaration. This joint statement sought a basis for reunifying Korea by peaceful means, without outside interference. It also established the North-South coordinating committee at a senior level, set up a "hot line" between Seoul and Pyongyang, and promoted Red Cross talks between the two sides. A series of meetings through 1972, 1973, and 1974, however, made it clear that a basis for agreement on substantive issues was lacking in a direct North-South forum. The South proposed moving ahead with small, limited steps that would build confidence and lead to a broader basis for unification; the North sought to establish a political framework that would create opportunities for influencing South Korean politics and undermining the status of the Seoul government. At the present time, the "hot line" is closed, but North-South talks have been resumed at the initiative of the late President Park. No evident results have emerged to date.

North Korea has exerted continuing pressure for reunification on terms that would greatly advance its own interests, while the South has been willing to accept, for the present, a division of the two Koreas. The South has proposed humanitarian measures for exchanging information on families and for developing some minor forms of social contact between North and South; the North has rejected these—probably to maintain its population's isolation from and ignorance of the South. The North-South talks seemed to arouse defensive reactions in both Pyongyang and Seoul. Apparently the Northern representatives were shocked by the relative material advancement of the South and were concerned that their people would become aware of the higher standard of living achieved in the ROK. The South apparently was concerned about the higher degree of discipline and control found in the North and feared that dissidence and disunity in the South might create opportunities for manipulation and subversive actions by Pyongyang. The ROK Yushin Constitutional Revision of 1972, which strengthened the authority of the President, may have been influenced by this concern.

The frustrations resulting from both international negotiating efforts and the bilateral North-South talks have brought virtually all negotiating efforts to a halt for the moment. Given the slim prospects for meaningful negotiations and the wide gap between the two Koreas, none of the larger powers accords a very high priority to Korean negotiations, although both Pyongyang and Seoul are apparently willing to sustain bilateral exchanges in order to avoid being accused of opposing negotiations. The United States has left the door open for a change in the North's position on trilateral talks but apparently is not pushing its proposal.

Future Prospects for Negotiations

The failure over the past twenty-five years to reach a stable basis for peace and to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula leaves scant cause for optimism about

the future. The inherent potential for renewed conflict produces a constant search for a military balance sufficient to deter hostilities, but South Korea is increasingly dynamic and productive in terms of military capabilities. The arms race will continue, with new prospects for employment of weapons with sophisticated technology and increasing strength of both the North and South armed forces, with the United States continuing to play the crucial balancing role in local deterrence. Unless agreements are negotiated, the DMZ will remain one of the most dangerous borders on the globe, with the increasing risk that renewed conflict will be difficult to localize, given the important national interests of the four major powers in Korea; however, the maintenance of Korean peace may be enhanced by the very fear that a local conflict would inevitably enmesh the concerned outside powers. The framework for future negotiations needs to be considered from various viewpoints: appropriate negotiating channels; the substantive issues involved; and possible incentives for agreement.

Negotiating Channels. Almost every possible forum for negotiations between North and South Korea has been attempted or proposed. In fact, recent proposals for negotiations have focused too much on the negotiating channels and too little on the substantive issues involved. If the political conditions for negotiations are favorable, the type of forum selected for discussions is of only secondary importance as long as the parties concerned, particularly the two Koreas, have confidence that the negotiating channel is not designed to undermine their interests.

There are three major substantive issues for negotiation: (1) negotiations relating to the reduction of North-South military tensions and the balance of forces on the Peninsula; (2) negotiations relating to North-South social contact and interrelationships; and (3) negotiations relating to the role of the outside powers in the affairs of Korea. Different forums are appropriate for each of these issues.

Negotiations on military tensions must involve at least those powers having military forces on the Korean Peninsula now or in the past. The logical forum is the MAC, in which all are represented. Beyond its role in pacifying incidents, the MAC is largely ignored except for initiatives for tension reduction generated by the U.S. (U.N.) Commander, with no supporting diplomatic efforts. Yet the MAC's role in developing and enforcing measures to reduce military tension along the DMZ will be critical. A serious initiative to reduce tensions, however, will need not only formal negotiations by the MAC but a full panoply of other diplomatic actions to buttress these negotiations in the capitals of the major powers, as well as steps to develop broad international support, including support within the Third World. The U.N. Command has in fact made a number of proposals in the MAC, including proposals to make more effective use of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC), which would ease the potential for conflict in Korea. Such MACoriginated proposals are likely to have no effect unless they are part of a broader negotiating effort and unless the North is prepared to participate seriously, under pressure from the PRC and the Soviet Union.

The second substantive area for negotiation, North-South bilateral relations, logically should continue to be left to the two parties concerned. The North-South Coordinating Committee and Red Cross talks are still in effect, and other private channels are also available. Nevertheless, impetus and support for effective negotiations on the part of the North depend on Beijing and Moscow. The South has demonstrated its willingness to keep open the bilateral Korean channel and to

probe for meaningful North-South negotiations, so future prospects rest with the North. In September 1978 Kim Il-sung left the door open to a resumption of a North-South dialogue, but he still attaches political conditions amounting to acceptance of his premises for unification. He is currently demanding talks between representatives of political parties rather than of governments, in an effort to buttress his policy of reunification through an all-party structure—a policy loading the dice in the North's favor.

The final negotiating area relates to the future roles of the outside powers in Korean security. Any agreements effecting a reduction of tensions will necessarily involve the outside powers, either directly or indirectly; and a whole range of issues—cross-recognition, admission of the two Koreas to the U.N., and new arrangements replacing the Armistice Agreement—will require direct participation by the outside powers.

Under present circumstances, any formal negotiations involving the interested powers look infeasible. The Chinese are likely to continue to reject a four-power proposal, since it would put them at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union with respect to North Korea. Five- or six-power talks including both the PRC and the USSR also seem unlikely, given the present state of Sino-Soviet relations. Even more unpromising is any revival of the U.N. General Assembly debate on Korea, given its past record and the membership's disinclination to become involved with Cold War issues. Finally, revival of the Geneva Conference is not likely to be an acceptable forum for dealing with Korean issues.

North Korea has proposed a negotiating format involving North-South talks on matters relating to the internal affairs of Korea and U.S.-North Korean bilateral negotiations on external matters, e.g., a peace treaty and withdrawal of U.S. forces. The proposal has some superficial attraction for the United States; for example, it might permit an extensive probing of the North's position, affording an avenue for influencing the North to negotiate seriously and change its basic stance on unification. But there is no evidence to support this view, and clear evidence exists that the North sees bilateral talks as a propaganda move according it greater prestige, placing the South at a disadvantage and adding a significant new divisive element to U.S.-ROK relations. Such talks would, moreover, justify the North's claims to sole legitimacy and arouse not-too-latent Southern fears of an American sell-out of its interests. The memory of U.S.-North Vietnamese negotiations is still fresh in ROK minds, and under these circumstances, whatever advantages might accrue from bilateral U.S.-North Korean talks are heavily outweighed by the disadvantages.

Assuming a desire on the part of North Korea to negotiate, the U.N. Security Council may be the more feasible channel. Chinese and Soviet membership in the Security Council provides a convenient cover for discussions with both, and private talks could be initiated under a Security Council guise. In the last analysis, however, any engagement of the outside powers in Korean negotiations must commence with private bilateral talks between the United States and the USSR and the United States and the PRC. Given the involvement of both communist powers in Korea and the unlikelihood of drawing them into joint discussions, parallel discussions with both the PRC and the USSR on measures to reduce Korean tensions are an essential starting point, even if negotiations and agreements should later be formalized in a broader forum such as the Security Council. The role of

Japan is likely to be peripheral, although Tokyo may be helpful in fostering an atmosphere favorable to negotiation.

Substance of Negotiations and Agreements. The range of issues open for negotiation is very wide, given the broad differences now prevalent, but the substantive issues can be broken down into three categories: (1) measures to reduce the level of military tension between North and South: (2) measures to stabilize a temporary two-Korea arrangement; (3) agreement on wider measures, such as a peace treaty or steps to unify Korea.

Measures for reducing military tension. The risks of conflict, whether calculated or accidental, are greatly increased by the close proximity of the two opposing forces within and along the DMZ. Measures to lessen this risk could start with demarcation of the line dividing the two zones, since patrols move constantly within the DMZ. Other measures could include firm agreements on procedures for investigating incidents and for direct and immediate communications at the outbreak of incidents, and on use of the NNSC in the control and investigation of incidents. A measure of greater significance would be the demilitarization of the DMZ, lessening the risk of incidents and providing a measure of deterrence against surprise attack. Even greater security would be attained by broadening the DMZ and establishing an international force within it, in the pattern of the Sinai peace force. Even the enforcement of Armistice Agreement provisions for the DMZ, however, would be a major step toward tension reduction.

Serious efforts to reduce tension would require participation of the political leadership of the outside powers, even though negotiation per se would be by the Armistice Commission. The problem in reaching agreement on these measures lies in their inherent disadvantage to the potential agressor and in past North Korean opposition. But the South is also likely to resist steps to demilitarize the DMZ, in view of past North Korean disregard of agreements on the DMZ and the greater difficulty the South faces in reciprocating Northern actions in violation of agreements.

Another potential area for reducing military tension is control over arms transfers. The Armistice Agreement provides for such control, including supervision by the NNSC. These provisions were flagrantly violated by the Soviet Union in the years immediately following the Korean War, and there is consequently little basis for attempting to reinstate them. The North Koreans are unlikely to give the NNSC the freedom of movement necessary to effect proper supervision of arms imported into Korea.

On the other hand, there have been de facto limitations on both sides regarding arms importations. The North Koreans have received an ample supply of ground weapons, including FROG 7 missiles, air defense systems, and technology for submarine and high-speed attack boats, but they have not received any advanced aircraft and have reportedly complained bitterly of Soviet refusal to provide MiG-23s. The United States has also limited the flow of high-technology weapons such as Lance missiles and other longer-range attack missile systems. Moreover, both Koreas have been clearly warned against efforts to develop nuclear weapons systems. These limitations have led to suspicions that an implicit agreement is already in effect to limit the flow of high-technology weapons to either Korea, but the evidence is far from convincing inasmuch as both the Soviet Union and the PRC have provided North Korea with the weaponry to constitute a viable offensive

capacity, and South Korea has developed the scientific manpower and industrial base to develop nuclear and other high-technology weapons.

The question for the future is whether the current unilateral limitations can be expanded upon, either through an explicit agreement or through implicit arrangements clearly understood by the outside powers and developed through a process of discussion that falls short of specific agreement. Conventional arms control measures are now being discussed by the United States and the USSR, and these could conceivably include Korea.

Any arms control agreements would have several shortcomings. First, such agreements have tended in the past to be more binding on the United States than on the USSR or the PRC, and violations are far easier to detect in South Korea. Second, an agreement—implicit or explicit—to limit certain types of weapons, such as advanced aircraft, might not necessarily stabilize the North-South military balance. The Koreans, in fact, place too much emphasis on "mirror imaging"—i.e., if the North has submarines, the South feels it must duplicate this force. As stated earlier, the structure of the two forces is not comparable, since the North focuses on an offensive ground attack capability and air defense, while the South Korean mission is defense supplemented by the U.S. deterrent. Different weapons systems are required to match these missions, and parallel restrictions on weapons imports might conceivably lead the South to focus on an offensive mission. Third, both Koreas have domestic defense industries capable of expansion, but the North Korean industry now is far advanced and can only be balanced by arms imports to the South. In the longer term, the balance could shift to the South, with its industrial and technology advantages. Finally, a U.S.-Soviet agreement fails to take account of other arms suppliers. South Korea has both the requisite foreign exchange and the access to other suppliers who are anxious to gain markets there; North Korea indeed may have indirect access through the sale of Western arms to the PRC. A U.S.-Soviet arms control arrangement would not be feasible or reliable among such a large group of suppliers, and there is even more doubt whether an explicit arrangement including both the PRC and the USSR would be possible.

Nevertheless, the problem of arms control is likely to become acute as both sides move to more technologically sophisticated weapons. The only feasible approach may be the present one, in which both Koreas and their international backers exercise restraint, bearing in mind the different missions of the two forces.

Measures for stabilizing the two-Korea division. While any steps to reduce military tension on the Korean Peninsula will have the inherent effect of stabilizing the current status quo, there are a variety of non-military measures that could achieve the same objective.

One means might be revival of the "hot line" and reactivation of the North-South Coordinating Committee and the Red Cross committees. Further efforts would include establishing preliminary contacts that would involve exchanges of information on locations of families, exchanges of mail, and, perhaps at a later date, limited movement between the two Koreas. The July 4, 1972, agreement also called for a moratorium on propaganda, which could be revived. More extensive relations would involve trade between the two Koreas, and possibly some form of mutual representation at their capitals, as well as more extensive movement between them. Clearly, the broader the interrelationship, the more likely it will be resisted by North Korea, and quite possibly by the ROK, given the growing differences in

the economic growth and prosperity of the two zones and the mutual suspicion that exists between them. The South Korean policy of inviting members of the pro-North Korean group in Japan for "family visits" is aimed at the North's concern with exposure to the South. But by the same token, South Korea has found the mutual ability of both sides to utilize any contact to infiltrate and influence their respective populaces unbalanced in favor of the North.

Given the problem of mutual suspicion, the conflicting ideological bases of the two regimes, and the growing gap in living standards, North-South interrelationships can probably develop only very slowly and step by step. The South has offered economic assistance to the North, but acceptance of this aid would constitute a concession of defeat in economic competition, which the North is not likely to agree to. By the same token, exchanges that would expose too much of the North's population to the progress of the South are likely to be resisted by the North because of their potentially discordant effects. The South would likewise be hesitant to permit many North Koreans into its area for fear of subversive activities. Yet such steps might be acceptable as part of a broader effort to reduce tensions and achieve a two-Korea accommodation.

The outside powers can substantially influence the stabilization of the status quo by their willingness to act in parallel, if independently, to provide either formal or de facto recognition of the two Koreas, and by their mutual willingness to enter into direct relationships with both sides. North Korea, through its observer delegation to the United Nations, already has a base of operations within the United States. South Korea has no comparable situation within the communist orbit, but the Soviet Union has recently become more liberal in permitting South Korean delegations to participate in international conferences and events within its borders. The first visit by a South Korean cabinet minister to a communist country was that of the Minister of Health, who attended a World Health Organization conference in the Soviet Union in 1978. The 1980 Olympics will require the Soviet Union to permit a much larger group of South Koreans to visit, unless the Soviets violate the rules of the game. South Korean contacts with representatives of the PRC have been reported on a very informal basis, but the PRC is much more circumspect, given its preferred position with the North and its determination not to give Moscow an opening in Pyongyang. At the present time, neither the PRC nor the Soviet Union is prepared for any more extensive contacts.

Should the Soviet Union and the PRC choose to move into broader contact with the South or accept a process of cross-recognition, in which they would recognize South Korea and the United States and Japan would recognize the North, there is very little the North Koreans could do to inhibit them. The critical factor would be the willingness of both the PRC and the USSR to move in parallel courses so that neither would feel that the other had any advantage in terms of its position in Pyongyang. At present, Soviet moves in this direction seem designed to warn the North that the Soviet Union may have other options, rather than to serve as a considered process of cross-recognition. Formal recognition could also conceivably be preceded by an opening of commercial relationships, perhaps on a triangular basis to avoid direct trade (as is possible now), then later permitting direct bilateral trade.

Membership of the two Koreas in the United Nations may be a more remote goal, although it could flow directly from a process of formal cross-recognition. The two Germanys have established a precedent for such action, of which North Korea

is now painfully aware. Kim Il-sung has gone out of his way, in fact, to reject this formula for Korea. During a visit by East German Prime Minister Honnecker to Pyongyang in early 1978 (which may well have been prompted by the Soviet Union in order to encourage adoption of the two-Germany formula), Kim forcefully rejected any parallelism between Germany and Korea. calling advocates of two Koreas "splitists." It is conceivable but not likely that membership of two Koreas in the United Nations, if approved by the Security Council, could precede cross-recognition, since it would ensure the type of parallelism that seems important in terms of Soviet and Chinese moves with respect to Korea.

In sum, the potential for progress toward stabilization of the two Koreas may lie more in developing arrangements among the outside powers than through a process of North-South talks.

More permanent solutions to the Korean problem. Prospects for unification of Korea or arrangements that would give a degree of permanence to the division between North and South are presently remote. The replacement of the Armistice Agreement by a peace treaty between the two Koreas along with a non-aggression pact and guarantees of security would seem to require a willingness to accept an indefinite division, and North Korea does not have that willingness. The goal of unification must be kept alive. South Korea has proposed a non-aggression agreement between the two Koreas, but this is likewise unlikely to come into effect because it gives a sense of permanence to the division, which is presently unacceptable to Pyongyang.

On the other hand, the North has pressed for unification through political measures, which would have the effect of legitimizing North Korean-sponsored opposition within the South without any reciprocity or hopes of a fair vote in the North. Efforts have been made by the United Nations to unify the area on terms essentially advantageous to the South, but these seem to hold very little promise of being acceptable to the North either now or in the indefinite future.

In sum, efforts that go beyond stabilizing the status quo seem unlikely to be acceptable at the present time. Neither unification nor permanent division is a viable negotiating objective.

Incentives for Negotiation. At the present time, the principal obstacle to any negotiating strategy is North Korea, which professes concern regarding South Korea, given the South's economic potential. Some of this concern may be legitimate, although the argument conveniently serves North Korean propaganda interests. North Korea sees any steps that would stabilize and solidify the division as a threat to its ambitions to achieve the downfall of the Seoul government and the unification of Korea on its own political terms—in effect, absorption within the communist system.

Neither the Soviet Union nor the PRC is prepared to press North Korea to accept any changes in the current situation, but both have indicated that they are prepared to discourage the North from military efforts to change the status quo in its favor. Neither wishes to further advantage the other, although the Soviet Union has moved to the point of developing limited contacts with South Korea.

The PRC presently has the predominant position of influence in the North, and it now has an even greater incentive to preserve that position, because of the close ties between the USSR and Vietnam and the hostility of the surrounding communist states (Laos and the People's Republic of Mongolia), with the exception of North Korea. The North clearly feels more comfortable with the Chinese than with

the Soviets, if only on racial grounds, but it has also pointedly preserved its independence even from Chinese influence. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has more freedom to maneuver and has done so. But neither power has sufficient incentive to pressure the North to adopt a fundamental revision of its policies, and both see unacceptable risks to their interests from doing so.

The political problem, therefore, is how to create a structure of incentives for both North Korea and its supporters to negotiate.

Recent history has demonstrated that crisis situations tend to force countries to face the need for a more solid basis for their security. A renewed Korean crisis that threatened resumption of hostilities might provide just the incentive necessary for the Soviet Union, the PRC, and North Korea to stabilize the situation. There are, in fact, a number of possible sources of crisis in Korea—for example, a North Korean-inspired incident to test the U.S. defense commitment, leadership succession problems in both the North and the South, or mischief-making by the Soviet Union. Continued adverse economic trends could also create a crisis in North Korean leadership.

There are distinct, and unacceptable, risks to developing and provoking a crisis scenario that is sufficiently alarming to motivate a change in communist policies. The major risk is obviously that the crisis situation might not be contained and hostilities would break out. On the other hand, if a crisis situation did arise as a result of an escalation of incidents along the DMZ or in Korean waters, the outside powers might have sufficient motivation to reduce tensions in the region. The tree-cutting incident of 1976 mentioned earlier had such a limited effect and produced arrangements reducing the risk of incidents within the Joint Security Area at Panmunjom.

Internal developments within North Korea may give the Soviet Union and the PRC increased leverage over North Korean policies. It is evident that North Korea has strained its resources to the limit in order to support its military establishment and at the same time keep its civilian economy going. It faces heavy external debt, with virtually no resources to invest in economic development. It also has serious internal problems, including shortages of power, transportation, and manpower; and its capabilities for domestic production of military equipment may be increasingly constrained by its lack of access to advanced technologies. In effect, North Korea, which has prided itself on its ability to maintain its independence, is likely to become more dependent upon its outside supporters, both for economic assistance and for higher levels of military and industrial technology. The North Korean dilemma will be further aggravated by the South's growing economic and military strength, as discussed above.

These prospective developments could provide both the communist powers and the United States with leverage over North Korean policy. On the communist side, the Soviet Union is likely to have the predominant leverage, since it has both the greater economic resources and the advanced technology required by the North, and it has less to lose by an initiative, given its subordinate position in the North. The PRC could influence Pyongyang through its provision of economic assistance, petroleum, and weapons, but it is far less likely to take any initiative.

American leverage in this situation can work in two directions. First, the ease with which the South can acquire new technology could influence the North, forcing it into a more dependent relationship with the PRC and the USSR. This situation would provide North Korea with a greater incentive to seek to reduce the

potential South Korean threat and improve its own relative position. In this context, stabilizing the status quo might be viewed as an advantage to the North, rather than to the South. Paradoxically, this scenario would probably result in North Korean pressures on the United States to retain ground forces in the South as a control against aggressive tendencies emanating from Seoul.

Major U.S. leverage is also likely to rest with the priority it attaches to the Korean situation, particularly should the bailout of North Korea become an imminent prospect for both the PRC and the USSR. If both Moscow and Beijing believed that their overall relationship with the United States would be affected by their actions with respect to North Korea, and if both also viewed the growing relative strength of the South as an increasing threat to the North, they could be motivated to stabilize the division.

Another potential incentive for the North to alter its policies rests with the level and status of U.S. forces in South Korea, and their effect on tensions in the region. There is no doubt that the North attaches the highest priority to the withdrawal of all U.S. forces, not only ground forces but also air assets, which have recently been strengthened. North Korea has exhibited great sensitivity to the nuclear potential of the U.S. forces in Korea. The Carter Administration has been criticized for not exacting a reciprocal price from the North for its initial decision to withdraw U.S. ground troops, given the North's urgent desire for that action. The linkage to North Korea's actions established in the July 1979 decision to suspend troop withdrawal opens the way to use this leverage.

Finally, a broader and more intangible incentive for Moscow and Beijing lies in the effect of tension reduction in Korea on the broader international environment, particularly in the Asian region. Both powers have a stake in maintaining peace and stability in Korea, if only in terms of their competitive and conflicting interests. Both likewise have a stake in improving their relations with the United States. Up to the present time, the United States has not accorded a very high priority to Korea in its broader relationships with either the Soviet Union or the PRC, but according a higher priority to Korea's role in East Asian stability might give the communist powers increased incentive to modify their North Korean policies. The linkage between Korean stabilization and normalization of U.S. relations with the PRC is an important consideration. While the Chinese have limited flexibility in pressuring the North to reduce tensions, they must also understand that an expected dividend from U.S. support of China's modernization plans is the creation of stability in East Asia, with Korea being an initial test.

CONCLUSION

At the present time, the prospects for reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula through a negotiating process cannot be considered promising. Neither North Korea nor its Soviet and Chinese allies have reached the point where a reversal of policy seems dictated. Pyongyang remains adamant in opposing a two-Korea accommodation, and its allies are not prepared to press for a change in its policy. But the balance in Korea during the 1980s will increasingly shift toward the South, and even the current prospects for North Korean military superiority may vanish. The growing economic and technological superiority of the South will present the North with even slimmer prospects for achieving unification on its own terms. In

fact, a role reversal, with the South pressing for unification and the North supporting a divided status quo, is not inconceivable.

Sooner or later, Pyongyang must face up to the changing situation on the Korean Peninsula and recognize the need to change its policy of unification, priority for military investment over civilian economic development, and continued independence from its communist supporters.

The United States can play a decisive role in influencing North Korean decision-making when the North finally reacts to its declining prospects. The objective of U.S. policy clearly must be to exploit this decisive moment, to steer the North Koreans away from a preemptive military strike against the South and toward a reduction of Pyongyang's military effort, combined with specific agreements to reduce the level of tension in Korea and to gain communist acceptance of a two-Korea accommodation.

The United States has both military and diplomatic tools at its disposal to achieve this objective. Reduction of U.S. troop strength provides an incentive if it continues to be linked to demonstrable steps to reduce tension. The North must be aware that there is a clear-cut price attached to troop reduction. Second, the United States can alter the military balance through the flow of technology and weapons to the South. Both the pace and scope of the expansion of South Korea's defense industry will be influenced by U.S. and ROK decisions, and both can conceivably be linked to tension-reduction measures. Finally, any measure to reinforce the U.S. defense commitment and emphasize its capability and determination to react with overwhelming military power to North Korean aggression will strengthen the deterrence equation and discourage North Korean preemptive tendencies. These military measures should have the further favorable effect of dampening Seoul's anxiety regarding the U.S. commitment and its tendencies to seek a unilateral deterrent.

Political stability in the South could also be a vital factor affecting North Korean decisions during the next few years. The North, in its search for alternatives, could mislead itself into deferring a change in policy or even into aggression by misreading signs of dissidence in the South. While the United States is not in a position to assure political stability in the ROK, its human rights policies could encourage the North to wait for and depend upon dissidence and dissention in the South to weaken the U.S. commitment. Succession problems in both the North and the South add a further element of uncertainty into the equation. One must anticipate unpredictable developments in the 1980s which the United States has very little capability to influence, unless it tries to intervene in the domestic politics of the South.

Finally, the "crossover" in the North-South balance during the 1980s and the consequent policy dilemma facing the North should offer an opportunity for diplomatic initiatives on the part of the United States and the ROK. The objective of the diplomacy should be to offer a combination of incentives and pressures to the North and its Soviet and Chinese allies to accept a reduction of tension and a two-Korea accommodation. A diplomatic initiative will need to exploit the increased leverage afforded Moscow and Beijing when the North turns to them, as it must one day, for increased economic and technological support. At this stage, the United States must establish the high priority accorded to a Korean settlement in its overall relationship with both communist powers. On the other hand, positive incentives

in terms of the dividends the North will enjoy from accommodation will also be required.

There will be a need to move in a parallel fashion, but separately, with the Soviet Union and the PRC. Neither will act if such action works to the advantage of the other in terms of relations with Pyongyang.

China is unlikely to take any initiative to exert further pressures on the North, at least until it is clear that the Soviet Union is willing to play in the same ballpark. Furthermore, Moscow's greater economic and technological resources give it the prospect for greater leverage with Pyongyang. An effort to negotiate reduction of tensions in Korea therefore should logically begin with an initiative toward the Soviet Union; only later can serious discussions with the PRC be expected to have any prospect for success. But developing a scenario for parallel Sino-Soviet action with respect to Korea depends to a large extent on the priority accorded Korea in the overall U.S. relationship with these powers.

Finally, the negotiating process will need refurbishing. In the past, the tendency has been to rely upon a single set of negotiations—a U.N. conference, or four-power talks, or North-South talks—and to emphasize the *forum* for negotiation rather than the *substance* of the negotiations, a mistake repeated with the trilateral talks proposal this year. The Korean situation will require a more sophisticated and multidimensional approach. It will require a combination of measures designed to reduce the level of military tensions along the DMZ, to improve the climate of direct North-South negotiations, and to stabilize the North-South status quo for the indefinite future through a process of cross-recognition. To achieve these objectives will in turn necessitate a series of parallel negotiations on different fronts, largely using existing mechanisms.

The Armistice Commission offers the best prospect for dealing with strictly military measures; revival of the North-South Coordinating Committee offers the best prospect for development of elementary intercourse between the two Koreas; and the U.N. Security Council may offer the best prospects for developing parallel approaches to the USSR and the PRC regarding steps toward cross-recognition. A negotiating effort moving in tandem on all three fronts will require careful coordination, confidence in the negotiating process on the part of South Korea, and elevation of priority in the level of U.S. representation in such talks. The critical element will of necessity be direct diplomatic approaches to the USSR and the PRC setting the stage for this multiple negotiating effort. Armistice Commission negotiations seeming to emanate from local levels, for example, are unlikely to attract any real response. On the other hand, Armistice Commission negotiations with clear support from Washington and coordinated efforts to renew the North-South talks, along with separate outside power discussions, could have an entirely different character in communist eyes. They are less likely to be ignored and more likely to attract broader Third World support, putting pressure on the North Koreans to respond or face the onus of being resistant to peace. In short, a piecemeal, low-key negotiating effort has far poorer prospects for success than a multiple-track, highpriority approach. Maximizing these prospects will require a sophisticated, concerted, and high-level negotiating strategy and a calculated sense of timing linked to increasing North Korean economic and military vulnerabilities and dependence on its communist supporters and the policy dilemmas posed by its increasing inferiority relative to the South.

GROUND FORCES COMPARISON		- 1980
	ROK	DPRK
PERSONNEL	540,000	700,000
ARTILLERY	2,500	4,100
MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS	0	2,000
TANK/ASSAULT GUNS	1,000	2,700
ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS	200	1,100

THE SOVIET UNION AND ASIA

Footnotes

- 1. Gail Lapidus has written a very suggestive paper regarding the issue of ethnic policies and problems, suggesting various alternatives that are possible in the future. The paper is entitled "Multinationality and the Survival of the Soviet Political System: Stabilizing and Destabilizing Factors." Paper delivered at a meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1981.
- 2. Two collections devoted directly to USSR Asian policies of recent vintage are Sung-joo Han, ed., The Soviet Union and International Relations in East Asia, Seoul: Panmun Book Company, 1980, and Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in East Asia, to be published by Yale University Press, 1982. Both of these volumes resulted from a conference or series of meetings, and contain various contributions, each of which takes up some facet of the policies and attitudes of the USSR toward Asia, and their implications for American policy.
- 3. One rather typical example of recent Soviet writing on China is to be found in the book entitled Peking Reaches Out: A Study of Chinese Expansionism, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1980 (Russian edition, 1979). This work represents a collection of articles by various scholars and political figures. One key theme is set forth in the introduction: asserting that the Chinese—in falsifying history—aim at proving that Mongols and Manchu were and are a part of the Chinese race, thus laying the basis for claims upon all lands conquered by Genghis Khan and other tribal peoples. Note the following sentence: "The reason for all this falsification is not far to seek: all the lands which once belonged to the Mongols, Manchus, and other of China's masters thus become part of China's territorial inheritance—the temporarily 'lost lands'." (p. 7)
- 4. For recent assessments of USSR military strength which include data on the Soviet military commitments to Asia, see Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China--1980--Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 96th Congress, Second Session, Part 6, June 30 and September 25, 1980, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1981. See also Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1981.
 - For a Japanese evaluation, see Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security--1981. Nikkei Business Publishing Company, Tokyo, 1981.
- 5. In addition to the foregoing work, see Gaston J. Sigur, "Soviet Policy in East Asia" in the study, Common Security Interests of Japan, U.S.

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and NATO, an Atlantic Council publication, Washington, D.C., 1981, and other essays in this volume.

For a Soviet perspective, see the article by the well-qualified Soviet scholar, Dimitri Petrov, entitled "Militarisation of Japan Is a Threat to Peace in Asia," <u>Far Eastern Affairs</u>, No. 2, 1981, pp. 49-63.

- For example, it was recently revealed that a prominent Malaysian political figure had been recruited as a Soviet agent, and there have been earlier episodes involving Malaysians and Thai.
- 7. For two earlier studies depicting Indian-Soviet relations, see
 William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers, New York:
 Praeger, 1972, and Wayne Wilcox, Leo E. Rose and Gavin Boyd, eds.,
 Asia and the International System, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers, 1972.
- 8. One interesting work providing a recent Soviet perspective is that of Ivan Kovalenko, Soviet Policy for Asian Peace and Security, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979 (English translation from a revised Russian edition).
- 9. In this connection, see the article, "The Third World and the U.S.-Soviet Competition: A Soviet View," by the prominent Soviet scholar, Henry Trofimenko, in <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, Summer 1981, pp. 1021-1040. Another article of importance in expressing Soviet attitudes is Evgeni M. Primakov, "The USSR and the Developing Countries," <u>Journal of International Affairs</u>, Columbia University, 1981, pp. 269-281.
- 10. For earlier evidence of the effort to keep ideology alive as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, see V. V. Zagladin, General Editor, The World Communist Movement--Outline of Strategy and Tactics, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973. Yet a perusal of this work quickly reveals the thin intellectual and factual basis upon which the analysis rests.
- 11. It can be argued that in seeking at present to create a scientific-technological elite, in seeking to restore certain managerial powers and responsibilities, and in reintroducing economic incentives for the industrial work force, the PRC government is moving toward, not away from the Soviet system. At the same time, many Chinese exhibit great unhappiness with such earlier Soviet borrowings as the separate Institute-University structure; the complete self-reliance (hence, heavy administrative burdens and unnecessary duplication) involved in having each unit operate its own facilities from kindergarten to kitchen; and the continuing overcentralization of the planning-allocation structure.

- 12. For a recent, most revealing perspective on these matters, see Si Mu, "The Present International Situation and Modern Socialist Construction in Our Country," in the Kunming Sixiang Zhanxian, No. 4, August 20, 1981, pp. 11-19, translated in JPRS 79344, November 2, 1981, China Report, No. 231.
- 13. Here, it is appropriate to recall Deng Xiaoping's statement to the effect that if the Soviet Union ceased its hegemonistic, aggressive policies, Sino-Soviet relations could be improved immediately—but if they continued on the present course, relations would remain unchanged for decades.
 - Earlier, China had demanded precisely the Russian actions regarding Outer Mongolia, Vietnam and Afghanistan which no Soviet leadership would conceivably take at this point.
- 14. In addition to the article by Dimitri Petrov cited above, see Kovalenko, op. cit., pp. 115-124. Neither of these articles, it should be noted, nor other published items play upon the theme of the inevitable move of Japan toward the Soviet Union for economic reasons, although hints are given. In certain private conversations, however, the theme is more clearly advanced.
- 15. For the background of Soviet-North Korean relations, see the work by this author and Chongsik Lee, Communism in Korea, Vol. I, The Movement, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. An analysis covering more recent trends can be found in my article, "The Dynamics of the Korean Peninsula--Maneuvering in an Uncertain World," Problems of Communism, November-December, 1981.
- 16. For two recent papers on Soviet policies toward Southeast Asia, see Seah Chee-Meow, "Soviet Interest in Southeast Asia: Issues in the Eighties," and Donald S. Zagoria, "Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia," delivered at the U.S.-ASEAN Conference on Economic, Political and Security Issues in Southeast Asia in the 1980's, November 2-5, 1981, Denpasar, Indonesia, and subsequently to be published by the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley. See also the paper by Douglas Pike, "Hanoi Looks to the Southeast," delivered in the same conference.
- 17. One recent journalist's appraisal of the situation in Pakistan can be found in the <u>Far Eastern Economic Review</u>, October 16-22, 1981, John Fullerton, "Islamisation, a hijack and a murder help foil Zia's foes," pp. 46-47; also Rodney Tasker, "On the Frontiers of fear," pp. 42-43, and the accompanying interview with General Zia-Ul Haq, pp. 43-46.
- 18. On current Indian politics, see Myron Weiner, "Congress Restored: Continuities and Discontinuities in Indian Politics," <u>Asian Survey</u>, forthcoming in 1982.

NORTH KOREAN GROUND FORCES

1970	1970 - 1980	
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	1970	1980
PERSONNEL	350,000	700,000
ARTILLERY (TUBE)	2,200	4,100
MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHERS	700	2,000
TANK/ASSAULT GUNS	006	2,700
ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS	100	1,100